BRENT LAB

JANUARY 2012

• Laurie Garrett publishes second article on the H5N1 work, framing the NSABB's recommendations as insufficient given the contemporary security landscape, entitled "Flu Season."
• NY Times editorial board publishes opinion piece which categorically opposes the two H5N1 studies and supports the NSABB's recommendations.
• Vicent Racaniello criticizes the NY Times editorial as scientifically uniformed in his "Virology Blog."
• Peter Palese publishes Nature commentary rejecting the NSABB's recommendations, using prior publication of the 1918 Spanish flu as warrant for publication of Fouchier and Kawoka's work.
• Michael Osterholm and Donald Hernandez publish explanation in ScienceExpress for why the security concerns raised by the two H5N1 papers outweigh the proposed benefits, and provide arguments against the rationales offered in defense of the work.
• Also in ScienceExpress Fouchier and colleagues provide first systematic defense of their work, addressing the security questions posed by their critics.
• Virologists working on H5N1 announce a voluntary moritorium on their work.
• Interview with Fouchier entitled "Flu researcher Ron Fouchier: It's a pity it's come to this" is published in ScienceInsider.
• Kawaoka publishes his first defense of his research in Nature.
• Fouchier continues to conduct interviews in defense of his work, including interviews with Dutch television.
• NSABB publishes fuller explanation and defense of their recommendations in both Nature and Science.
• Rober Webster publishes commentary supporting NSABB's decision in mBIO.

FEBRUARY 2012

• Declan Butler of Nature reports on growing debate over H5N1 lethality and the trustworthiness of the WHO case fatality rate estimations.
• The WHO convenes meeting in Geneva to discuss extending the moratorium and to reconsider the question of full publication.
• The WHO publishes recent report on possible ad hoc solutions to the communication of H5N1 research consistent with their international framework.
• Peter Palase and colleagues publish meta-analysis in ScienceExpress questioning the WHO's estimation of the letalithy of H5N1.
• Michael Osterholm and Nicholas Kelly publish counter meta-analysis defending the WHO estimations.
• American Soceity of Microbiology (ASM) hosts meeting on "Biodefense and Emerging Diseases" during which there is an ad hoc session on the H5N1 work. In this session Fouchier defends his work and provides fuller explanation of the question of pathenogicity. Tony Fauci announces that he and others have asked the two researchers to revise their papers and for the NSABB to review those revised manuscripts.
• ScienceInsider reports on the confusion set in motion by Fouchier's presentation at the ASM meeting.
• The LA Times reports that the National Security Council is working on new regulations for research with deadly viruses and toxins.

MARCH 2012

• Representative Jim Sensenbrenner sends letter to White House demanding clarification of US response to the H5N1 studies.
• ScienceInsider asks members of the NSABB to respond to Fauci's request that the review revised manuscripts.
• At the request of the NIH the NSABB holds two day meeting to review the revised manuscripts. The NSABB recommends that both revised manuscripts be published in full.
• New federal policy entitled "Policy on the Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern."

APRIL 2012

• Michael Osterholm writes letter to Amy Patterson, Associate Director for Science Policy at the NIH, arguing that the March meeting of the NSABB was structured to produce the decision that was ultinmately reached by the members.
• NY Times editorial board publishes an editorial entitled "The Latest on the Doomsday Virus" criticizing the government's handling of the H5N1 studies, including references to Osterholm's letter.
• Amy Patterson publishes letter rebutting Osterholm's account of the March NSABB meeting.
• The Senate Homland Security Committee holds hearings on biological security and dual use research. Text of testimony by Thomas Inglsby. Video of hearings.

MAY 2012

• The National Academy of Sciences hosts meeting titled "Issues raised, lessons learned, and paths forward for dual use research in the life sciences: the H5N1 controversy; a workshop," to review how the handling of the H5N1 studies has unfolded and whether the work was justified. Workshop description. Video.
• Roger Brent, CBF director, provides introductory presentation for the NAS meeting.
• Rich Roberts presses Anthony Fauci on the justification for the H5N1 studies at the NAS meeting
• Kawaoka paper published in Nature.

MARCH 2011

• Fouchier group co-authored paper on cross-protective immunity. Cited by Fouchier in support of the claim that his engineered strain of H5N1 may not be deadly to humans.

AUGUST 2011

• Fouchier group paper reporting limited success in identifying generalizable genetic mechanisms responsible for human-to-human transmissibility.

SEPTEMBER 2011

• ESWI newsletter reports on Fouchier's announcement that his group has created a mammalian transmissible form of H5N1.
• Scientific American frames significance of Fouchier's work as a matter of public health in an article entitled "What will the next influenza pandemic look like."
• New Scientist reports on Fouchier's work, framing it as a means of making a lethal pandemic "Five easy mutations to make bird flu a lethal pandemic."

NOVEMBER 2011

• WHO releases statement of concern that Fouchier and Kawaoka work will undermine the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness framework.
• New Scientist reports that the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) is reviewing the Fouchier and Kawaoka papers for possible limited publication, "Bioterror fears block crucial flu research."
• ScienceInsider breaks the H5N1 story to a broader audience in a piece entitled, "Scientists brace for media storm around controversial flu studies."

DECEMBER 2011

• Laurie Garrett publishes a first extended review of the H5N1 work in Foriegn Policy in a piece entitled "The Bioterrorist Next Door."
• Thomas Inglsby and colleagues from the Center for Biosecurity publish statement criticizing the H5N1 research in a commentary entitled "The risk of engineering a highly transmissible H5N1 virus."
• NIH releases NSABB's recommendations for redacted communication of the two H5N1 papers.
• Anthony Fauci, Gary Nable, and Francis Collins of the NIH publish commentary in the Washington Post supporting the H5N1 work, entitled "A flu virus risk worth taking."